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claims are rejected on direct appeal, counsel has exhausted his state reme-
dies, and may proceed directly to federal habeas. 15 Upon federal habeas,
the federal court may make factual findings de novo and is not bound by
previous state court holdings. This strategy strips the state court of anoth-
er opportunity to make adverse factual findings against the defendant, and
defense counsel is urged to employ it. The primary noncapital issue
which Burden brings to light involves the conflict of interest inherent in
the representation of multiple defendants. While defense counsel is not
categorically barred from representing clients with potentially adversari-
al interests, it is strongly discouraged:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised with-
in the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and
free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his per-
sonal interests, [nor] the interests of other clients ... should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
16
15 See Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 761 (1993), and case sum-
mary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. Of course, some
claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and withholding of
exculpatory evidence, are properly presented for the first time in most
cases at state habeas. State court fact findings on those matters cannot be
avoided.
The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility specifically warns
lawyers about the pitfalls inherent in the representation of multiple
clients:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment
required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation
of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises
whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients
who may have differing interests, whether such interests be
conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
17
When representing capital defendants, attorneys should be cognizant of
the delicacy of the proceedings and should, at all costs, avoid represent-
ing anyone who might compromise the defense of the capital defendant.
Summary and analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
16 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-1 (emphasis
added).
17 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-14 (emphasis
added).
WASHINGTON v. MURRAY
4 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1993)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
A jury convicted Earl Washington, Jr. of the rape and capital murder
of Rebecca Lynn Williams, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
the conviction on direct appeal. 1 Washington, a black man with an I.Q.
of 69,2 had confessed to police.3 Before trial, Washington's counsel
received exculpatory forensic evidence which he did not introduce. The
evidence was in the form of blood type test results from semen stains
found on a blanket on the bed where the attack occurred; the results
excluded Washington as the depositor of the semen.4 Washington raised
the issue of his trial counsel's failure to appreciate the significance of the
forensic evidence as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at federal
habeas. The district court denied his petition without an evidentiary hear-
ing, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded. 5 On remand, the
district court found that Washington had not received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.6 Washington appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the case a second time.
7
I Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985).
2 Washington v. Murray (Washington 1), 952 F.2d 1472, 1475 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("that of a child in the 10.3 year age group").
3 Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 542, 323 S.E.2d at 582.
4 Washington I, 952 F.2d at 1476.
5 Id. at 1475.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that counsel had failed the per-
formance prong of the Strickland v. Washington8 ineffective assistance of
counsel test, but holding that the defendant had failed to show the requi-
site degree of prejudice caused by the failure.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In the landmark Strickland case, the United States Supreme Court
established the standards of review of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. 9 It formulated a two-prong test to assess the performance of the
trial attorney and the prejudice, if any, to the defendant. 10
As to the performance prong of Strickland - which considers
"whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circum-
stances"11 - the district court concluded that counsel had made a "strate-
6 Washington v. Murray (Washington I), 4 F.3d 1285, 1286 (4th
Cir. 1993).
7 Washington II, 4 F.3d at 1286.
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9 1d.
10 Id. at 687-696.
11 Id. at 688.
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gic choice" based upon a hypothetical question concerning what counsel
would have done if he had been aware of the significance of the blood
type evidence. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this finding, not-
ing that before trial "counsel was completely in the dark about the import
of the evidence, and therefore, could not have made a strategic choice
against using it.'
12
As to the prejudice prong of Strickland - which considers whether
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different ' 13 - the
district court concluded that Washington had not been prejudiced. On
appeal the defendant claimed that the district court had required too great
a showing of prejudice and "maintain[ed] that the correct standard was
whether a juror might reasonably have determined that the forensic evi-
dence created enough doubt so as to prevent a finding of guilt."
14
Washington claimed the court had "substituted its own judgment" for that
of the jury concerning the exculpatory value of the evidence. 15 The Court
of Appeals disagreed, asserting that Strickland had been followed,
because the evidence was inconclusive and not sufficient to sway a
jury. 16
Interestingly, Strickland plainly set out upper and lower limits of the
prejudice prong. The Court stated "that a defendant need not show that
counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in
the case" 17 because a proceeding can be unfair "even if the errors of
counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have
determined the outcome." 18 On the other hand, the Court insisted that
"[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some con-
ceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding" because "not every
error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the
reliability of the result of the proceeding." 19 As the Court showed with
these upper and lower limits, "probability" does not encompass one
threshold standard; a probability can be high or low - it is simply the
chance that an event will occur. The Strickland court demanded only a
"reasonable probability" of a different result, not a high one. This could
mean a thirty percent probability, for example, or any "reasonable" prob-
ability less than fifty percent. Arguably the Washington court applied a
standard higher than that which Strickland commands. The Court of
Appeals held that the district court followed its "specific instructions"
and the Strickland test on remand.20 It should be noted, however, that
these instructions included an example of evidence that would serve to
negate "to a high degree of probability Washington's identity as the
rapist."2 1 The Court in Strickland rejected the "more likely than not"
standard as too high.22 Any mention of negating "to a high degree of
probability" seems inconsistent with Strickland.
12 Washington II, 4 F.3d at 1288.
13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
14 Washington 11, 4 F.3d at 1289.
15 Id.
16 This determination was made when the consideration of evidence
for the Commonwealth was presented for the first time at habeas pro-
ceedings. See discussion of dissenting opinion of Judge Butzner, infra.
17 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
18 Id. at 694.
19 Id. at 693.
20 Washington II, 4 F.3d at 1289.
21 Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1479 (emphasis added).
22 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court stated that such a standard
like the newly discovered evidence standard - "presupposes that all
the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding
were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. An ineffective
assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that
the result of the proceeding is reliable, so... the appropriate standard of
H. The Confession
Since the Strickland prejudice test involves determining what the
jury would have done had the forensic evidence been introduced, the role
of Washington's confessions becomes crucial. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that even with the evidence, the prosecution had a strong case
relying solely on the details in the confession. 23 At a pretrial suppression
hearing, the trial court found that Washington had knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his Miranda rights before making the confession despite his
claim that his mental retardation rendered the confession involuntary and
the fact that many of his admissions did not entirely match the details of
the crime. The Court of Appeals, on its first hearing of the case, affirmed
that "[alIthough the question of the voluntariness of a confession is a
question of law, state court findings about the circumstances surrounding
a confession are presumed to be correct.
' 24
I. The Dissent
The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the performance
prong of the Strickland test had not been satisfied, but argued that the
defendant had been prejudiced by this failure. He stressed that the only
time that was relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
the time at which trial counsel received the forensic report. At that time
all the available evidence showed that Washington was not the depositor
of the semen and in fact pointed to another suspect. He criticized the
majority for accepting the Commonwealth's post hoc justification of the
lack of prejudice: Washington could not have been excluded said the
prosecution since - and this theory was first offered at state habeas -
the semen stain might have been mixed with vaginal fluid and therefore
have been inconclusive. "Prejudice arises from the defense counsel's fail-
ure to show the jury how [the inconclusive semen test] evidence under-
mined the Commonwealth's case.
' '25
IV. The DNA Evidence
The Commonwealth performed a DNA test in the fall of 1993 on a
sample of sperm that was found inside the victim. This test identified a
genetic characteristic that could not have come from Washington, the vic-
tim herself, or from the victim's husband.2 6 Since the victim managed
before dying to tell police that she had been attacked by a sole black
man,27 this evidence tended to exclude Washington as the perpetrator of
the crime, either acting alone or with an accomplice. This new evidence
was not available before the Court of Appeals decided this case on
September 17, 1993.
prejudice should be somewhat lower." Id. (citation omitted).
23 Washington II, 4 F.3d at 1290.
24 Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1482. See Campbell v. Commonwealth,
194 Va. 825, 830, 75 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1953) (trial court's factual finding
"is to be given the same weight by the appellate court as is accorded the
finding of fact by a jury" and "the trial judge has wide discretion and this
discretion will not be disturbed on review unless it has been abused");
Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 675, 212 S.E.2d 293, 297 (1975)
("Factual findings of voluntariness are not disturbed on review unless
plainly wrong."); See also Boggs v. Bair, 892 F.2d 1193 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Supreme Court of Virginia's affirmance of a factual ques-
tion - level of intoxication as it related to the voluntariness of a confes-
sion - was entitled to deference).
25 Washington II, 4 F.3d at 1292 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
26 Bill Miller, Wilder Undecided on Plea for DNA-Based Pardon,
The Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1993, at Dl.
27 See Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 540, 323 S.E.2d at
581.
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V. Clemency
On January 14, 1994, Earl Washington, Jr., accepted a conditional
pardon from Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder, commuting his sen-




All attorneys should be aware that a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is not a personal attack. Even the most experienced attorney
28 Peter Baker, Death-Row Inmate Gets Clemency: Agreement Ends
Day of Suspense, The Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1994, at Al.
29 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that the right to
appointment of a mental health expert attaches once an indigent defen-
dant shows that sanity will be a significant factor in his defense; lower
courts have expanded this right to include more than mental health
experts). See case summary of Spencer v. Murray (Spencer II), Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
30 For example, at Washington's penalty trial, the defense called an
expert for the purpose of showing defendant's low level of intellectual
can overlook or not understand forensic evidence, but every attorney can
independently seek help or can make an Ake 29 motion for appointment of
an expert to help in understanding the significance of forensic reports.
Likewise, attorneys should educate themselves about mental retar-
dation. It is not the same thing as insanity, 30 and a qualified evaluation of
a defendant's level of mental retardation is a necessity.
3 1
Summary and analysis by:
Barbra Anna Pohl
functioning. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth's attorney was
permitted, over objection, to testify that Washington knew the difference
between right and wrong. This, obviously, is a question relevant to the
complete defense of insanity, rather than the mitigating sentencing factor
of mental retardation. The colloquy suggests, however, that the prosecu-
tor and court may not have understood the distinction. Washington v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 546, 323 S.E.2d at 585.
31 See Silvia Linda Simpson, Confessions and tile Mentally
Retarded Capital Defendent: Cheating to Lose, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
SMITH v. DIXON
14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
A jury sentenced Kermit Smith, Jr. to death following his conviction
of the December 3, 1980, first-degree murder, second-degree rape, and
common-law robbery of Whelette Collins. After the jury convicted
Smith, the trial court held a sentencing hearing in which it submitted four
aggravating circumstances and five mitigating circumstances for consid-
eration by the jury. The jury found the aggravating circumstances in sup-
port of the imposition of the death penalty on all four bases submitted. 1
On appeal of his conviction and sentence Smith did not challenge the
constitutionality of the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravat-
ing factor. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Smith's con-
viction and sentence,2 and when the United States Supreme Court denied
his request for certiorari, 3 his conviction became final on November 29,
1982.
1 The four aggravating circumstances found were that the murder
was committed while (1) raping, (2) robbing, and (3) kidnapping Collins,
and (4) that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 670 (4th Cir. 1993). See case summary of
Smith, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 18 (1993) [hereinafter
Smith 1].
2 State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264 (N.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1056 (1982).
3 Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
4 Smith's Motion for Appropriate Relief raised fifty-seven issues
grouped into five "Claims", with his challenge to the "heinous, atrocious
or cruel" factor being Claim No. IV and his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim being Claim No. V.
5 The order stated:
In June 1983, Smith filed his first application for post-conviction
relief with the superior court and raised for the first time the argument
that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" statutory aggravating
factor was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Smith also claimed that the jury was not
charged on a constitutionally limiting definition of this factor and that his
attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and
appeal.4 Without conducting a hearing or requesting a response from the
State, the superior court entered an order denying Smith's request for
relief.5 Subsequent petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina 6 and the United States Supreme Court7 were summarily denied.
Smith's second motion for relief was filed in superior court in North
Carolina and was again denied.8 Both the Supreme Court of North
This matter was heard on a paperwriting entitled "Motion for
Appropriate Relief' filed June 6, 1983 by [Smith's attorneys].
The court has read the paperwriting and considered the
arguments in support of the claims set out therein. The court
finds as a fact that the Claims No. I, II, I, and IV, set forth no
probable grounds for relief.
It is concluded that the matters alleged in Claim[] No. V
constitute a sufficient showing to require a plenary hearing ....
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Claims No. 1, 11, 111, and IV are denied.
2. A plenary hearing in Claim[] No. V is to be held.
6 State v. Smith, 333 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1985).
7 Smith v. North Carolina, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
8 State v. Smith, Nos. 80 CRS 15265, 15266, 15271 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 9, 1987).
